Abstract Disposable credit card numbers are a recent approach to tackling the severe problem of credit card fraud, nowadays constantly growing, especially in the context of e-commerce payments. Whenever we cannot rely on a secure communication channel between cardholder and issuer, a possibility is to generate new numbers on the basis of some common scheme, starting from a shared secret information. However, in order to make the approach meaningful from a practical point of view, the solution should guarantee backward compatibility with the current system, absence of new investments in dedicated hardware, wide-spectrum usability, and adequate security level. In this paper, we propose a solution based on the use of standard mobile phones, fully meeting the above desiderata. Importantly, our solution does not require any cryptographic support and, as a consequence, the use of PADs or smart phones, opening then its usability to a wider potential market.
Introduction
Credit card fraud is nowadays a serious problem whose dimension is constantly growing. Indeed, there are a number of techniques exploited by attackers during both on-line and traditional transactions to steal the fixed credit card number used for authentication and to use it for fraudulent payments. This is a direct consequence of the intrinsic weakness of the traditional credit card system, where the key used for authentication is long-term, semi-secret, transmitted over insecure and sometimes completely disclosed channels.
This has induced many credit card issuers to produce cards equipped with a chip [39, 43] in order to harden the authentication process. However, due to both the necessity of maintaining backward compatibility with traditional point of sale terminals (POS) and the variety of utilizations of credit cards (for example, on-line transactions, reservations, etc.), the simple authentication based on a credit card number will remain allowed reasonably still for a long time. Moreover, credit cards are still widely used in e-commerce as well as in other e-activities when alternative secure payment methods, like [38, 33] , are not applicable or preferred.
Besides the possibility of detecting fraud [16, 12, 5, 10, 21, 34] , a recent approach to tackling credit card fraud is based on the concept of disposable credit card number (DCCN), also called one-time credit card transaction number. According to this approach, issuer and customer agree on a number to be used for the transaction, then they discard it and generate a new number for the next transaction. This way, stealing an authentication number during a transaction does not give the attacker any useful credential.
There are commercial solutions based on the above scheme [35, 8] . Some of them expect the cardholder to get the disposable number from the issuer Web site after authentication by sensitive data (like a standard credit card number or a password), thus resulting in a solution still insecure or impracticable if the user cannot start an Internet connection before each transaction. Other solutions are too expensive, when the issuer provides the cardholder with an additional device capable of generating and displaying the disposable number. In the last case, the cost of the solution strongly limits its real applicability.
Concerning how to generate DCCNs, there have been a number of proposals in the literature. In [36] , customer and issuer share a long-term cryptographic key. Before each transaction, the customer generates a new authentication number by encrypting a set of possible restrictions describing some elements of the transaction itself. Once the issuer has received the above data, he decrypts it by the long-term secret key and verifies the purchase. A similar approach, also based on encryption, has been proposed in [46] .
Stating that encryption is too expensive to be realistically used in this context, the authors of [40] propose the use of context free grammars (thus not relying on any cryptographic algorithm) to generate disposable numbers. Context free grammars present the property that the generation and validation of strings belonging to a given language can be done in polynomial time, but it is unfeasible to find the grammar given only the strings generated by it, since any conjectured grammar may fail on a new input string. However, the authors do not give any suggestion about how con-text free grammars have to be generated. As a consequence, an unlucky generation of the grammar may allow an attacker to easily guess the grammar. Moreover, as stated in [41] , there exists no theoretical result about the difficulty of guessing another string belonging to the same language, thus showing the impossibility to guarantee the security of this technique.
Also the authors of [24] state that in some application scenarios, the requirement on encryption devices may not be affordable and in [25] propose a more efficient solution using cryptographic hash functions rather than encryption. Starting from a secret key shared between issuer and customer, a new DCCN is obtained by computing a cryptographic hash function on the concatenation between the secret key and the latest authentication number. Even though the computation of cryptographic hash function is more efficient than encryption, the necessity of having a standard smart card (i.e., an embedded computer), still remains.
In this paper, we make a step ahead with respect to the results presented in [25] , which represents the state of the art in this context. Indeed, we propose a new DCCN generation scheme that is designed to work on small resource constrained devices. Thanks to this feature, we can implement the scheme on standard mobile phones since it does not require any cryptography support (indeed, the most part of standard mobile phones do not provide the cryptography support). This is certainly a key feature of our proposal, since it represents a solution to the problem of credit card fraud that can be considered really feasible from every point of view, including the market one.
The first reason of the above claim is that the solution does not require massive investments from the side of issuers (no smart card, no high computational load). It is well known that the seeming low attention towards security aspects shown by issuers is actually the right compromise of a trade-off between costs to implement radical innovations and costs to refund customers victims of fraud [29, 20] .
The second (more important) aspect to consider in order to justify the claim about the full feasibility of our technique concerns users, who are typically well-disposed to concentrate their personal services on a single handy device. Despite the undeniable recent rapid grow of the market of smart phones or PDAs, we expect that in the next years we will have still users reluctant to discard their standard (possibly cheap) mobile phone in favor of a more expensive, less user-friendly, powerful device. For this reason our solution is based on the use of standard mobile phones with no advanced feature apart from the (universal) Java support and Bluetooth.
As a further reason of feasibility of our technique, we observe that our disposable number format is the same as the current one. This backwardcompatibility feature is, in contrast, typically ignored in other approaches, which thus miss a very important issue from a practical perspective. Indeed, this is a necessary condition to maintain existing point of sale terminals.
Finally, observe that the disposable number generation scheme here presented is an extension of another scheme proposed in the context of Web authentication protocols [3] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we give the preliminary background necessary to better understand our proposal. In Section 3, we present a summary description of the DCCN generation scheme and the architecture of the system used by customers for credit card payments. The detailed definition of the elements composing our scheme is given in Section 4. The practical application of our proposal exploiting standard mobile phones is discussed in Section 5. Since the robustness of our method against possible attacks is the necessary condition for a valid proposal in this topic, we deeply analyze the security of our scheme both theoretically and experimentally in Section 6. Finally, in Section 7, we draw our conclusions.
Credit Card Process System
In this paper, we propose a number generation scheme for DCCNs. An important issue is understanding how this scheme has to be designed to produce a solution really applicable in the current credit card system. To this aim, we describe the information stored into the magnetic stripe of a credit card.
According to the ISO/IEC standard 7811 [18] , a magnetic stripe contains three tracks, even though typically only the first two tracks are used. The information stored on the tracks are: a Primary Account Number matching the credit card number printed on the front of the card, a country code, the cardholder's name, the expiration date and, finally, some discretionary data typically used to save other cardholder's information (for example, the address). Concerning the primary account number, for a standard 16-digit credit card, it is a tuple MII, INN, AN, C containing a single-digit major industry identifier (MII) (4 for Visa, 5 for MasterCard, and so on), a five-digit issuer identifier number (IIN), an account number (AN), and a single digit checksum (C) computed by the Luhn algorithm [26] . The digits from 7 to 15 are used by banks to authenticate their users 1 . One could think that guessing a valid credit card number is not very difficult, since only 9 digits should be hit (the first 6 digits are fixed and public for each bank and the last one can be easily computed). However, besides the primary account number, also additional information is exploited to harden the transaction, like the card expiration date, which limits the threat of identity theft, or the security code printed on the back of the card.
Since the most important portion of the credit card number is the 9-digit account number (issuer, major industry, and checksum values can be calculated), our goal is to design a scheme to produce, at each transaction, a new 9-digit number that, combined with MMI, INN, and the resulting checksum, will be used for the next transaction.
We conclude this section by briefly illustrating the bank-side credit card verification protocol. Algorithm 1 encodes the protocol currently used to validate a credit card number (we do not describe here the check involving the card expiration date and the card security code). It consists in checking that the credit card number is associated to the cardholder's name in the database of valid credit cards. In the next section, we will show how this protocol should be slightly modified in order to implement our proposal.
Overview of the Proposal
In this section, we give an overview on the framework proposed to prevent credit card fraud. We recall that it is based on the use of DCCNs generated according to the scheme presented in the next section. Besides this scheme, the second component of our framework is the application executed on the mobile phone of the user in order to display a disposable credit card number before a transaction. This application is presented in Section 3.2.
The DCCN Generation Scheme
The core of the proposal is the definition of a number generation method that meets the strong efficiency requirements illustrated in the introduction. Note that the approach proposed in [25] as well as other disposable-numberbased methods proposed in the literature in the context of secure credit cards [36, 46] requires devices supporting cryptography since it is based on the use of cryptographic hash functions. Thus, at least PDAs or smart phones are needed. In order to allow the use of standard cellular phones, a new lightweight method is thus necessary. Of course, considering which kind of application we are facing (i.e., electronic payments), we have to pay no price in terms of security. This is our case, as exhaustively shown in Section 6. Here we give a rapid overview on the proposed number generation scheme in order to help the intuition of the reader and to highlight that the required computational effort definitely does not hinder the implementation of the scheme on mobile phones. Now we show how the scheme is used to generate DCCNs. The scheme, which receives a 511-bit string s 0 , called initial seed, and a positive integer c, exploits the following functions:
1. a reversible function B, named basic function, used to modify the seed; 2. a non-cryptographic hash function H, named hash function, used to produce a 64-bit string from a seed; 3. a projection function P producing a DCCN from a 64-bit string.
The scheme is shown in Figure 1 and implemented by Algorithm 2. Starting from the initial seed s 0 and using the basic function, it is possible to create a chain of values s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , . . . such that s i = B(s i−1 ) for each i ≥ 1. Since the function B is reversible, this chain can be traversed also backward by computing s i = B −1 (s i+1 ). Consequently, the chain values are not required to be pre-computed and stored, but they can be generated on the fly (the resulting advantages regard validity checks of already burnt numbers, like in case of refunds).
The c-th value of this chain (i.e., s c ) is used to compute x c = H(s c ), where H is the hash function. Observe that c works as parameter for the choice of the seed to be used. Concerning the hash function H, we observe that the approaches followed in previous schemes [14, 15, 23, 25] use cryptographic hash functions which satisfy the collision-resistant property, that is, it should be hard for an attacker to find a message such that its hash value equals a given value. In our scheme, this requirement is not necessary. Indeed, in our scheme, the hash function is used to avoid that the knowledge of x c gives an attacker the possibility to guess s c . To reach this goal it suffices to rely on the non-injective behavior of the hash functions. In particular, we just have to require that the set of hash-colliding values has a enough large cardinality. In this case, the attacker is able to find many seeds having x c as hash. However, if the value s c chosen by the attacker differs from the actual s c , then the probability that the attacker guesses the successive disposable numbers is negligible, as proven in Section 6.3. This allows us to utilize in our scheme a non-cryptographic hash function, with evident advantages in terms of efficiency.
However, it is worth remarking that our approach does not consist simply in the substitution of a hash function in place of a cryptographic one in a typical number generation scheme (like [25] ). It is intuitive understanding that this would result in a very insecure approach just because of the weakness of the hash function itself (and because, in a scheme like [25] , a new number is calculated as the hash of a seed that contains the number obtained at the previous step). We have designed thus a new hash function and, coherently, a new number generation scheme guaranteeing the security of the approach.
Finally, concerning the last step of our scheme, by means of the projection function we generate the disposable credit card number as P(x c ). The projection function is necessary to transform the value obtained by the hash function into a valid credit card number, according to the rules described in Section 2.
The Application
As stated in the introduction, the first requirement we intend to meet is to maintain backward compatibility with the current credit-card numbering, which will remain allowed reasonably still for a long time. To this aim, it is important that the disposable 16-digit credit card numbers are compliant to the standard format described in Section 2.
Currently, the credit card number is stored into the magnetic strip in such a way that it can be read by the point of sale during a transaction. On the one hand, this is an advantage for the customer who does not have to remember any information. On the other hand, this makes fraud based on credit card counterfeit easier. Indeed, an attacker who is able to physically access the credit card, even for a short time, may clone it by means of a skimmer. Of course, the use of a dedicated device capable of storing and displaying the number could be a better solution from a security point of view. However, this solution would have a significant extra cost seriously limiting its applicability.
For this reason, we propose a system in which users exploit their mobile phone to generate DCCNs. Next, we briefly describe the functionalities of the system (their more technical presentation is given in Section 5):
1. Installation. Users are clients of a bank offering the service. When the user goes to his bank for getting a credit card, the bank installs on his mobile phone the application that produces and displays DCCNs. In this phase, the bank is responsible for the user identification. Note that the physical presence of the user is a measure typically used in the context of strong authentication (for example, to provide smart cards for digital signature generation), since the initial identification is dramatically critical. Then, the user receives a closed envelope containing both the activation code and the PIN necessary to run the application that must be kept secret. Like for credit card numbers, the last digit of both the activation code and the initial PIN is computed by the Luhn algorithm [26] (see Section 2) in order that accidental typing errors are detected. Concerning the installation of the application on the mobile phone, we observe that due to multitude of mobile phone brands, it would be impossible to transfer the application to the mobile phone by making use of specific equipments (like a data cable). The easiest and cheapest way is to exploit Bluetooth. Of course, during the installation all standard security precautions are adopted. For example, in order to avoid eavesdropping, the bank uses a Class 3 Bluetooth connection [27] having a useful range of 1 meter. 2. Activation. Only the first time the user runs the application, he has to enter the activation code ensuring that no one can see this code. If the code entered by the user satisfies the Luhn checksum, then this value is stored by the application. Otherwise an error message is displayed.
Observe that DCCNs will be generated on the basis of the activation code entered in this step, since the initial seed of the generation scheme is derived from a combination of such a value with some initial data stored at the installation time. This step is used to tackle an insider attack. Indeed, also in case a dishonest employee of the bank copies the application, he cannot run it correctly without the knowledge of the activation value. 3. Payment. When the user has to make a payment by credit card, he has to run the application on his mobile phone. The execution will display the current DCCN as well as the additional information necessary for the transaction (like the expiration date). These data will be typed in the merchant's point of sale (POS) in case of card-present transactions or will be used to complete a Web form in case of card-not-present transactions. In order to avoid identity theft done by stealing the client device, the user is asked to enter the PIN. Whilst doing this, the user should ensure that no one can see the PIN. If the PIN entered by the user does not satisfy the Luhn checksum, then the user is asked to enter again the PIN. For security reason, after three consecutive wrong PINs the application will get locked. It is worth noting that, in order to give added protection against stolen device attacks, the PIN is not stored into the mobile phone and the PIN is not just an access control for the application but it is inherently integrated in the whole process of the disposable number generation. This issue will be deeply addressed in Section 6.1. 4. PIN change. Since the use of a fixed PIN presents an increased security risk, it is a good practice to update the PIN periodically (typically 30-90 days, as recommended). The system allows for PIN change by means of a procedure composed of three sequential steps. In the first step, the user runs the PIN change functionality of the application and is prompted for the old (current) PIN. After typing the old PIN (that is validated according to the Luhn checksum), he is asked to enter the new PIN twice to avoid typing errors. As typically occurs, the typed numbers will not appear on the display and the choice of a good PIN is recommended. Then, the application displays a confirmation number CN which depends on the old and the new PIN. To complete the PIN changing procedure the user has to execute the second step which consists in connecting (by the phone itself or also by a PC) to the Web page of the site of the bank allowing PIN changing. Here, the user enters its username and the confirmation number CN produced by the mobile phone. After the check of the validity of CN , the bank updates the user's PIN and replies by a commit value CV . Finally, the user enters CV into the mobile phone, thus concluding the PIN change procedure. In Section 5, we illustrate how CN and CV are generated and validated.
Consider now the design of such an application. Since it has to run on the user's mobile phone, it is very important that its hardware and software requirements are as less restrictive as possible, in order to maximize the number of mobile phone models on which the application can run. In fact, even though the spread of powerful mobile devices, such as PDAs, is constantly increasing, there will be still for a long time users equipped with standard mobile phones unable to run complex applications (like, for example, that requiring the execution of cryptographic operations). Moreover, any solution based on a complex generation scheme requiring users to buy a smart phone or a PDA cannot be considered acceptable.
As a consequence, in the design of our application and, consequently, of the underlying DCCN generation scheme, we require that it could be implemented by a traditional mobile phone. As we will show in Section 5, we achieved this result by implementing the application as a MIDLET, a Java program for embedded devices, which can run on any device implementing Java ME Mobile Information Device Profile. This ensures that any J2ME-enabled device (in practice, almost the universe of current mobile phones) can run the application. Now we describe the slight changes to the current credit card number validation process (presented in Section 2) necessary to implement our proposal. Algorithm 3 shows how the new validation protocol operates. Now, besides the credit card database, the bank has to store also the current seed s i for each user. The new protocol is composed of the traditional one (see Line 1 and Lines 8-11 of Algorithm 3), where it is checked that the credit card number is valid, combined with the computation of the next valid disposable number, its insertion into the database of valid credit card numbers, and the removal of the burnt credit card number from the database (Lines 3-6). In order to guarantee compatibility with traditional credit cards, the protocol Lines 3-6 are executed only for transactions using disposable numbers (this is checked by Line 2 of the protocol). 
Algorithm 3 Validate a DCCN

11: end if
The above bank-side validation protocol is a simplification that does not take into account the case of delayed charge (for example, occurring when credit cards are used for hotel reservation, car renting, etc.). In this case, the merchant submits an authorization request to validate the number but the effective amount is charged in a subsequent time. In our proposal, in case of authorization request, the bank system does not burn the number (if currently valid) but associates this number with the merchant ID. Afterwards, this disposable number may be used only by the same merchant. This solution can be also adopted in the case of permanent payment authorization (like the charge of a subscription on a credit card). The validation protocol has to be slightly modified in order to search for the number to be validated also among those already used in a past transaction, accepting the transaction only in case the merchant of the current transaction is the same as the merchant of the past transaction (this eliminates the risk of reply attacks).
Finally, in order to maintain a synchronization between numbers generated by the user device and numbers expected by the bank, it is necessary to keep into the valid credit card database, for each account, a queue of valid numbers instead of just one. In the literature, there exist a number of approaches to dealing with the above issue, also to deciding the right length of stored queues (see for example [25] ), which could be adopted also in our validation scheme (this issue is outside the scope of the paper).
Disposable Credit Card Number Generation Scheme
In this section, we give the definitions of the elements composing the number generation scheme, which are the basic function B, the hash function H, and the projection function P. Observe that their implementation cannot proceed orthogonally. Since the non-secret result is the composition of the three functions, we have to avoid that they are based on the same elementary operations, which would give the attacker useful information to proceed by crypto-analysis techniques. To prevent this, as we will explain in the following sections, the basic function is based on string reverse and sum, the hash function is based on XOR and shift, and the projection function is based on scaling operations.
Before going into detail about the elements composing our scheme, we need some preliminary notations. Notations.
-We denote by x k = (x 1 , . . . , x k ) a k-bit string, where x j , with 1 ≤ j ≤ k, represents the j-th bit numbered from left to right. -Finally, we denote by 1 k (0 k , resp.) the k-bit string composed of all 1s (0s, resp.).
The Basic Function
In this section, we define the basic function B. We recall that the basic function allows us to generate the sequence of seeds used in the scheme. The function is defined as follows.
In words, B(s k ) is obtained by reversing the string s k and, then, by summing 1 (modulo 2 k ). Since this function allows us to have a new seed at each generation, it should be necessary that its period is as large as possible, hopefully 2 k (the upper bound), in order to have a negligible probability of re-generating a past seed during a plausible life of a credit card. Theorem 1 in Section 6.4 proves that the above goal is reached provided that k is odd.
An interesting feature of the basic function is its efficiency to compute s c (i.e., the seed used to generate the next DCCN) starting from the initial seed s 0 . Algorithm 4 shows how to do this computation. The algorithm consists 
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[s] k−b = 1 24: end if 25: return s of three blocks. The first one (Lines 1-7) produces i/2 increments by 1 of the seed on the right side. Each increment is achieved in the following way. We start from the right-most bit. If it is equal to 0, then we set it to 1 and stop the procedure. Otherwise, it is set to 0 and the procedure is iterated to the left-most adjacent bit. The second block (Lines 8-14) produces i/2 increments by 1, done on the left side of the seed in the same way as described above. Finally, in the third block (starting at Line 15), which is executed only when i is odd, the seed is reversed (Lines 16-18 ) and an additional increment by 1 of the seed is done (Lines 19-23 ).
Observe that the algorithm to generate s c directly derived from the basic function definition would require c reverse operations and c increments. In contrast, the algorithm presented above needs at most 1 reverse operation (no reverse if c is even) and c increments. The amortized cost of each increment is constant in the number of bits of the seed. Indeed, it requires to set to 1 either the right-most bit, when the last bit of the seed is 0 (the probability that this case occurs is 1/2), or the second last bit when the seed ends by 01 (this has probability 1/4), or the third last one if the string ends by 011 (the probability is 1/8), and so on. As a consequence, the amortized complexity of c increments is 
The Hash Function
As observed in Section 3, our proposal is based on the use of a non-cryptographic hash function in order to guarantee that an attacker cannot guess the current seed s c starting from the knowledge of x c (see Section 3).
The first question is understanding if some already existing hash function can be used for our purpose. A good candidate could be CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check) [17] , a non-cryptographic hash function that is widely used in error-detection contexts, both for its effectiveness to detect many kinds of errors and for its efficiency.
Let us describe first how CRC works. CRC is computed to produce a n-bit string, named checksum, starting from an arbitrary length string, called frame, such that also a slight change of the frame produces a different checksum. The checksum is computed as the rest of the binary division with no carry bit (it is identical to XOR), of the frame, by a predefined generator polynomial, a (n + 1)-bit string representing the coefficients of a polynomial with degree n. CRC is thus parametric w.r.t. the generator polynomial and for this reason there are many kinds of CRCs. For example, the most frequently used are CRC32 or CRC64, that generate a checksum of length 32 and 64 bits, respectively. Obviously, the higher the checksum length, the better the effectiveness of CRC in error-detecting is. Besides dependence on the generator-polynomial length, CRC is parametric w.r.t. the value of its coefficients. Consequently, the efficacy of CRC strictly depends also on the latter parameter. There are standard generator polynomials. Among those, in the following we will refers to the ECMA standard [9], since we argue that a 64-bit fully tested CRC offers satisfactory robustness features.
CRC satisfies the requirement introduced in Section 3. Indeed, given a k-bit frame s k and its w-bit (with k > w) checksum c w computed by CRC, there exist 2 k−w (colliding) k-bit strings s k i such that CRC(s k i ) = c w . We may vary k and w in order to increase the number of collisions generated by CRC to any value. For example, by setting k = 511 and w = 64 we can produce 2 447 collisions to the goal of making practically infeasible a brute-force attack attempting to find s k (see Section 6.3). Moreover, its implementation easiness and efficiency make CRC very appealing to be used in this context. Besides these nice features, CRC is not immune from malicious attacks exploiting its linearity w.r.t. XOR (this issue will be widely discussed in Section 6.5). This weakness has been documented in the literature and already exploited in some application contexts, like Wep [1, 42] ). So we have to design a new hash function keeping the nice computational features of CRC but eliminating its weakness.
The idea is to apply a cyclic right shift to the seed before the CRC computation. Clearly, the number of such shifts cannot be equal for each seed, otherwise the prediction described above can be identically applied. The solution is that the number of cyclic right shifts applied on a given seed is equal to the number of 1s occurring in the seed itself. Observe that the string produced by the hash function is 64-bit wide. As a final remark, note that the analysis concerning the security of our hash function as well as of the whole generation scheme is provided in Section 6.
The Projection Function
The 64-bit string x 64 c generated by the hash function cannot be directly used as disposable number, but it has to be converted in order to become a credit card number compliant with the numbering format described in Section 2. The projection function P performs this task. It receives a 64-bit string and returns a DCCN. The first step consists in computing the dynamic 9-digit number AN as follows (the symbol denotes the operator floor, which returns the rounding to the nearest integer towards minus infinity). In words, the domain of the function is partitioned into 10 10 equi-width buckets (numbered from 0 to 10 10 −1). The bucket in which the value x i falls determines the returned value AN C . This results in a uniform distribution of ANs over the 9 digits.
The second step to do in order to have the final DCCN is the computation of the 16-th digit of the credit card number, that is, the Luhn checksum [26] . It is computed as follows. Starting from the 15 digits of the credit card number (which are, we recall, the single-digit major industry identifier (MII), the five-digit issuer identifier number (IIN) and the dynamic 9-digit account number generated above) we double the value of every alternate digit. If after the doubling the result is greater than or equal to 10, then we subtract 9. At this point we sum (modulo 10) all the values so obtained. The Luhn checksum is computed as the difference (modulo 10) between 10 and the result of the latter sum.
As a final remark observe that the projection function introduces a masquerading effect of the hash value to which it is applied in order to calculate the credit card number. Indeed, the attacker could only try to guess the hash value corresponding to a sniffed credit card number by a brute force attack handicapped by the fact that there is no way to test the validity of the supposed hash. This event is anyway very improbable. It is easy to see that the probability of guessing the source hash value starting from the knowledge of the corresponding credit card number is 
Implementation and Computation Issues
In this section, we illustrate a possible implementation of the number generation scheme so far described, in order to highlight that a strong positive point of our proposal is its feasibility, efficiency, and cheapness, since it is implementable on standard mobile phones. We remark that this aspect is very relevant in this context, due to both the importance that issuers give to the economic impact of any innovation regarding security of credit card transactions and the slow impact of our solution on user's routine, since our system does not require the user to be in possession of a smart phone or a PDA. For this reason we designed the application as a MIDLET. For both implementing and testing the MIDLET, we exploited the Sun Java Wireless Toolkit [44] , a tool widely used in several contexts [6, 45, 19, 30, 32] . In particular, we used the JTWI target platform with MIDP 2.0 and CLCD 1.0 and no additional API. This ensures that any J2ME-enabled device (in practice, almost the universe of current mobile devices) can run the application. Differently, the approach proposed in [25] (or any other disposablenumber-based method proposed in the literature in the context of secure credit cards) requires a more powerful device supporting cryptography.
In our application, the seed length has been set to 511 bits which, as we will see in the next section, guarantees a high security level. However, there is no technical difficulty in increasing this value in order to further harden the system. For security reasons, the initial secret seed is not saved as a Record Store of the MIDP Record Management System since this could allow an attacker to easily get it. The initial secret seed, called Seed emb , is embedded into the MIDLET code. Moreover, the implementation exploits two variables saved as Record Store, namely P IN dif and Seed dif . In particular, P IN dif is the difference (computed by the XOR operation) between the initial PIN given by the bank and the PIN chosen by the user, whereas Seed dif is the difference between Seed emb and the last seed computed by the generation scheme. Initially, P IN dif and Seed dif are set to 0. Now we describe in detail the operations done during the three phases carried out by the user and sketched in Section 3.2.
-Activation. The first time the user runs the application, the variable Seed dif is set to the activation code entered by the user. -Payment. In order to generate a DCCN for the payment, the user has to run on the mobile phone the payment application which works according to Algorithm 5. First, the application requires the user to enter the PIN. If P IN ⊕ P IN dif does not satisfy the Luhn checksum, then an error message is displayed. Indeed, P IN ⊕ P IN dif should be equal to the initial PIN generated by the bank so that the last digit should be the Luhn checksum. Otherwise, the application runs the function Generation DCCN (see Algorithm 2) using Seed emb ⊕ Seed dif and P IN as parameters. We recall that the function returns the new seed (Seed), which will be the initial seed for the next payment, and the disposable credit card number for the payment (DN ). The application updates 
Observe that the last term (i.e., the checksum) is used to ensure the integrity of P IN new and that the use of the operator − → x protects against attacks based on the linearity of CRC, like that described in Section 6.5. We recall that − → x is obtained from x by circularly right shifting it as many times as the number of 1s occurring in it -see notation introduced at the end of Section 4. The resulting number, say CN , is sent to the bank that carries out the second step of the procedure (Lines 6-13). The bank, knowing the current seed and the old PIN of the user, can compute the next DCCN, say DN 1 , and validate the received data (Lines 6-10). In case of successful check, the PIN of the user stored by the bank is updated (Line 11), the next DCCN, say DN 2 , is computed according to the new PIN (Line 12). Finally, the XOR between DN 2 and the new PIN, say CV , is sent to the user in order to authenticate the bank and to close the transaction. The user receives CV that is typed in the mobile phone and the last step of the procedure (Lines 14-19) is executed. The application checks the correctness of CV (Lines 14-17) and, in positive case, updates the variables P IN dif and Seed dif to the correct values, thus, concluding the procedure.
The MIDLET implementing such operations is a jar file with a size of about 4 kilobytes. It has been loaded on a Samsung SGH-D600 in order to validate the proposal. The application is very user-friendly. After it is executed on the mobile phone, the user is asked to enter the PIN for authentication (Figure 2 .a) and then a new DCCN valid for the next transaction is displayed (Figure 2.b) . For security reason, after three consecutive wrong PINs the application will get locked. 
Algorithm 6 PIN Change Procedure
Display the invalide CN message and exit. 10: end if 11:
Display the invalide CV message and exit. 17: end if
Concerning the efficiency issue, we observe that our scheme relies on very efficient operations. Indeed, as discussed in Section 4, the basic function needs one reverse operation and one increment, the hash function uses shift and XOR operations, and the projection function requires just one division and a sum (for the computation of the Luhn checksum).
In order to better support the above argumentation, we have measured experimentally the time needed to generate DCCNs. The results show that a normal mobile phone, like that used in our experiments, is able to implement our scheme and can generate more than 10 5 disposable numbers in less than one second. Moreover, we have experimentally measured that our scheme is more than one magnitude order faster than the one described in [25] based on SHA-1. Indeed, we computed 10 9 disposable numbers by our scheme in about 300 seconds, whereas the approach in [25] required about 3800 seconds. The last experiment was carried out on a 3.40 GHz Pentium IV CPU with 1GB RAM. Observe that the efficiency aspect is in most cases not particularly critical from the user side, since the generation of a new number is anyway macroscopically fast. However, for very slow devices, a speed-up of one magnitude order can be actually perceived (for instance if we move from 0.5 to 5 seconds). Beside the above extreme case, we consider this aspect a nice feature of our approach because computational optimizations are in general important goals of software systems. More importantly, the aspect of efficiency discussed above is highly relevant as far as the issuer side is concerned, due to the importance that the scalability of the solution has in this context, and since our lightweight calculation scheme lowers the pressure on the providers of investing new money in their infrastructure.
Security Issues
In this section, we analyze the robustness of the proposed number generation scheme both by statistical analysis of randomness and by considering a number of possible strategies followed by an attacker to guess future DCCNs. In our threat model, the attacker wants to have the possibility to generate a valid disposable credit card number. In order to reach this goal, the attacker can steal the mobile phone of a user, run, copy and modify the application to generate disposable numbers, read any Record Store of the MIDP Record Management of the mobile phone, know the user's PIN and any past disposable number used. In this section, we will discuss the robustness of our solution w.r.t. all the above threats. For the sake of presentation, the proofs of the theorems are reported in Appendix.
Stolen Device Attack
Data recorded on credit card magnetic stripe can be easily extracted by skimming, an operation done very quickly by everyone has (even temporary) access to a credit card. A scenario for skimming is typically a restaurant where a dishonest employee obtains the costumer's credit card for the payment and swipes the card by a small electronic device that stores the data necessary to counterfeit the credit card. All is done without the victim detects it.
We observe that the use of the mobile phone to store sensitive data (i.e., 16-digit number, expiration date, security code number) gives the advantage of making such a type of attack harder. Indeed, since the secret seed is embedded into the MIDLET's code, its extraction cannot be done in a short time but requires the attacker to have possession of the mobile phone for a longer time. This increases the probability that the victim becomes aware about the attack. As in the case of credit card theft, if the device is lost or stolen, the holder must notify the bank in order to disable his account.
In case of stolen device, the possibility that the attacker could generate DCCNs simply by running the MIDLET is prevented by the PIN request. In particular, observe that (1) the mobile phone does not stores this PIN but only verifies that the PIN entered by the user satisfies the Luhn checksum and (2) the DCCN displayed on the mobile phone depends on the PIN entered by the user. Concerning (1), we observe that realistically assuming a 5-digit PIN (4 plus the 1-digit Luhn checksum) the probability that an attacker guesses the correct PIN is 10 −4 . Moreover, observe that an attack of this kind does not generate a completely wrong DCCN. Indeed, if a wrong PIN, say i, is used starting from the valid seed, say s 0 , then the produced DCCN is obtained from s i . As a consequence, a request to authorize any DCCN generated starting from any seed except the correct one can be detected, thus raising an alert to the bank concerning a possible stolen device attack.
In case the attacker steals the mobile phone and knows also the PIN, then our solution cannot avoid the threat. Indeed, the attacker has all that is needed (i.e., the device and the PIN) to generate the disposable number.
Randomness of the Generation Scheme
According to the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) [4] that established opportune criteria for quality of deterministic random number generators, we demonstrate that our credit card number generation scheme is at least in class K2. Following the qualitative intuitive description reported in [11] , schemes in K2 generate random numbers having similar statistical properties to random numbers which have been generated by an ideal random number generator. Membership to class K2 is characterized by the passing of five specific statistical tests. Such tests, whose validity is well known [13, 37, 47, 7, 28, 22, 7] We have generated a 20,000-bit wide sequence of numbers by means of our scheme and we have performed successfully the five tests above. In detail, the sequence passed the monobit test since the measured result 10,206 lies in the allowed interval (that is, from 9,654 to 10,346). The result of the poker test has been 24.8 (it must range from 1.03 to 57.4). Test T3 (run test) refers to a maximum subsequence of 0s or 1s occurring in succession. The sequence passes the run test if the number of occurrences of run lengths lies within the permitted intervals. In Table 1 the results obtained (denoted by Ob.) as well as the expected intervals (denoted by Ex.) for several run lengths are reported. These results are referred to runs of 0s and 1s (1s are bracketed). The sequence passed test T4 (long run test), since no sequence of length 34 occurred. Finally, the results measured for the autocorrelation test (with shift τ from 1 to 5,000) have been always in the expected interval (that is, from 2,326 to 2,674).
Brute Force Attack
Consider the case the attacker knows one DCCN used by the victim, which we recall contains AN i generated according to our scheme. First, the attacker has to guess the source hash value (i.e., x i of the scheme) starting from AN i . Since the projection function maps in an uniform way all 2 64 x i in the set of 10 9 AN i , the probability of success is ( found) differs from the actual s i (i.e., the current seed of the fraud victim), then the probability that AN i+1 = AN i+1 is 1 10 9 , where AN i+1 is the next credit card number obtained by s i and AN i+1 is that obtained by s i , respectively. This value coincides with the probability of guessing a valid credit card number with no background knowledge. Now consider the case the attacker knows a sequence C of c consecutive DCCN spent by the victim. By a brute force attack, the attacker should test ( c seeds to find a seed s such that it produces such a sequence C. Observe that, since our generation scheme produces a mapping between a set of 2 511 strings and a set of 10 9 (i.e., about 2 30 ) numbers, until c is less than 511/30 − 1 ≈ 16, the probability to guess also the next DCCN of the victim is again 10 −9 . For higher c, this probability becomes 1 but the number of seeds to test is really too large (more than 10 143 ).
Function Periodicity
The function B is used to generate a new seed, thus it is important that its periodicity, that is, the value j such that s 0 = s j , is as large as possible, hopefully 2 k (i.e., the upper bound). This means that, starting from a kbit string s k , it is possible to generate 2 k − 1 different new seeds before re-obtaining s k . We prove that such a requirement is satisfied whenever k is chosen odd (i.e., k mod 2 = 0).
Proof See Appendix.
Now we prove that also the definition of H preserves the property of the basis function of generating 2 k different seeds. Thus, we have to guarantee that two different seeds do not collide into the same value after the shifting. The next theorem ensures this.
CRC-Linearity-Based Attack
In Section 4.2 we have seen that CRC is not immune from malicious attacks exploiting its linearity w.r.t. XOR. In particular, it holds that CRC(a XOR b) =CRC(a) XOR CRC(b), that is, the checksum of the XOR of two numbers is equal to the XOR of the checksums of the two numbers. In our case, this property of CRC could be in principle exploited by an attacker to obtain the hash of the i-th seed of an user (i.e., x i =CRC(s k i )) starting from the knowledge of (1) the hash of the j-th seed of the user and (2) the XOR between s k i and s k j . Moreover, observe that the basic function operates a reverse of the string at each step just to introduce a suitable "noise", moving away its behavior from the pure XOR (that would allow the attack described above). The simple increment (the simplest basic function that one could imagine) behaves exactly as a XOR every time the sum does not produce carry (i.e., every two steps). Unfortunately, it is easy to verify that the introduction of the reverse operation, even though beneficial, is not enough. Indeed, every two steps, the "noise" introduced by the reverse operation is quasi-cancelled. We use the prefix quasi because the basic function includes also the increment at each step.
To understand how this could be exploited for an attack, we observe that when a seed s k i has both the left-most and the right-most bit 0 (i.e., every four steps), the attacker knows that s . This is a symptom of the alternating destructive effect of the reverse operation and, further, of the general invariance of the internal part of the seed, when the basic function is applied. Observe that this negative effect is maximum whenever the seed is palindromic, because the effect of the reverse is null also on a single step.
The next theorem gives us the probabilistic support that a quasi-random generation of the initial seed prevents this drawback for the entire credit card life. Proof See Appendix.
The theorem states that (i) fixing both the first and the last two bits of the initial seed (to 10 and 00, respectively), and (ii) ensuring that the seed contains an internal centered range whose bounds are distant log 2 t +1 from the bottom (and the top) of the seed itself such that at least one 0 occurs in this interval, then it results that for at least t applications of the basic function (thus, at least for the next t credit card transactions), we do not generate bad seeds (i.e., seeds of the form 10 · · · 01). For example, in order to have the above property for the first t = 1, 000, 000 transactions, assuming a five-digit PIN it suffices to set the initial seed to 10s It is easy to verify that the probability that a randomly generated string s k−84 does not satisfies the above requirement is 1 2 k−84 . Thus, the blind random generation could be also accepted, since in our case having k = 511 this probability is 
Palindrome-Based Attack
As described at the beginning of Section 3, our generation scheme needs an initial seed s k , a k-bit string where k is a parameter suitably fixed. The robustness of the scheme depends on both the length and the value of the initial seed. In the previous sections, we have already shown some requirements k has to satisfy. A first requisite, motivated in Section 6.4, is that k is odd, in order to guarantee that the basic-function period is 2 k . The natural way to set the initial seed is clearly its random generation. Nothing seems to dissuade from this simple and effective approach.
However, note that the reverse done by the basic function is vanished whenever the string is palindromic. This forces us to understand if a random generation of a seed can (probabilistically) result in such a bad situation. The next theorem shows that the probability of this event is actually negligible for sufficiently large k.
Theorem 4
The probability that a randomly generated k-bit string, with k mod 2 = 0, is palindromic is 2
On the basis of the above theorem, we can easily realize that for treatable values of k, the resulting probability is negligible. For example, if k = 511, then the probability of having a palindromic initial seed is 2 −255 .
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a system to tackle credit card fraud based on the use of disposable credit card numbers. Our proposal exploits standard mobile phones to produce DCCNs, thus resulting in a very economic and practicable solution. The target of cheapness has been reached by designing a DCCN generation scheme requiring very simple and efficient operations yet maintaining a high level of security. The seeming low attention towards security aspects shown by issuers is actually the right compromise of a trade-off between costs to implement radical innovations and costs to refund customers who are victims of fraud. This explains why the aspects related to the feasibility of any proposed innovation to harden the credit card transaction processing is definitely important. As a future work, we plan to improve our application in order to support wireless payments by Bluetooth and to extend our proposal to authentication in other contexts, such as e-banking, where mobile phone could replace the devices given by banks to generate one-time passwords necessary to access e-banking services.
